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It is even more difficult to write intelligibly about drafting
than to draft intelligibly. - quoted in Namasivayam (1967)
Abstract: There are some parallels between the world of law and the world of
information systems practice. This paper draws on some insights from the former to
discuss some issues in the formulation and implementation of information systems
(IS) strategy. The crafting  of laws of a country is a process that entails argumentation,
negotiation, compromise and exercise of power in the societal context of ideology,
power structure, culture and historical legacy. Once formulated, the law goes through
a process of interpretation by the key players and other stakeholders. While laws are
intended to forbid certain practice, society and economy can sometimes profit by
ignoring them. Finally laws are also enacted in a move to provide legitimisation for
certain activity. All these features can be found in the formulation IS strategy and its
implementation. These features in the law-related phenomena are not exhaustive.
They are meant to stimulate further studies to draw upon insights from the rich
activity of legal practice to help us inform and reflect on IS strategy formulation and
implementation.
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1 Introduction
Consider something called X that exercises or is supposed to exercise immense
influence on behaviour of members of a social unit. X takes a long-term view of
social development; it is an object of contention of all interested parties. Even though
X is formulated in as clear a language as possible, its interpretation is just as
important and contentious. Though X is supposed to function as a tool guiding
activity or behaviour, there are almost inevitable cases where it makes practical sense
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to not to ignore it. X represents something that is common in social life. We  can
recognise  it as high level economic policy, a,~ a piece of law, or as m information
systems strategy.
The aim of this paper is to draw upon some interesting insights f&m the world
of laws to reflect on information systems strategy of an orgar&tion. I must hasten to
add that such exercise has its limits. Like an old bicycle, it cannot bring  you too far.
But it CZUI  nonetheless help US to articulate  our (re-)thhl&g  ad reflection on sOme
of the key issues in the area of IS strategy formulation and implementation.
Both law making and formulation of an IS strategy are human activities taking
place within a concrete wider context, be it societal, historical, and orga&ational  or
business environment. They are guided by social norms and ethical rules, either
written or otherwise. They are supposed to extract lessons from the past and to d&i1
the lessons in a forward looking way in order to guide future actions. Legal reasoning
is seen as a branch of practical reasoning, which is the practical application of human
reasons to decide how to conduct themselves in the matter of choice (MacCormick
1994). The use of human reasons in strategy formulation is emphasized by Hofer and
Schendel (1978) in the allocation of resources to achieve organizational objectives.
Both the legal process and the IS strategy process are associated with political contest.
The outcome can be a compromise, or the clear victory of the dominant party over the
others. Though formally enacted, both laws and IS strategy are not able in themselves
to resolve controversies in the implementation. The resolution of controversies
involves interpretation of the rules, which keeps in play the arguments of principle
that lie behind the document. The interpretation of a law occurs after the formal
formulation of the law and occurs in the light of concrete circumstances which are
often different from the circumstances surrounding the deliberation of the law.
Because of these, the whole discourse and debate associated with interpreting the law
during its implementation may not repeat the same arguments and points as in the
original  process of formulation. Here precedents from one’s own social unit or
similar cases from other social units function as important sources to enrich the
argumentation.  Given that laws making and enforcement have a rich history behind
them, it may come as a surprise that they are rarely used as a source of inspiration in
information research and practice. An exception is Stamper (1987) who notices a
lega 1 drafting. Both couldstrong affinity between systems analysts and the process of
be thought of as quests for meanings.
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In the following sections, I would deal with four areas which exhibit
similarities between laws and information system strategy. These are certainly not
exhaustive. Rather they are meant to serve as points to stimulate further inquires and
reflection. First is the tortuous process of drafting and enacting a piece of law.
Second, the world being quite complex, these laws have to be skilfully  interpreted
when they are confronted with the world of practice. Third is the phenomenon of
persistent tendency of the social world to give rise to practices that are officially
discouraged or forbidden. Another manifestation of such behaviour is that things can
function happily without written rules. Fourth is the use of laws or IS strategy as some
kind of symbolic phenomenon. These four aspects are discussed in sections 2, 3, 4
and 5 below. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Complex Process of Drafting and Enacting a Law
Before a law goes finally into the statue book, there is a long tortuous process
of sensing the need for a new law or amending an existing law, drafting it, debating it,
and persuading the legislative body to approve it. This is a broad picture how things
proceed in a parliamentary democratic state. How things occur in other political
systems is another matter, to be touched on later. The process is complex and cannot
be easily described, which promoted a former First Parliamentary Counsel to warn
that “it is even more difficult to write intelligibly
intelligibly (Namasivayam 1967 : p. xi). For a law to
reflect social need either in the light of social change or
same time it must not break violently with the past so
about drafting than to draft
have social relevance, it must
changing attitude, while at the
that a sense of continuity and
coherence is not lost. At the same time, it must be broad and flexible enough to take
care of the problems likely to arise in the near future. It is as if we are to paraphrase
Mintzberg (1989: p.42): While law is a word that is usually associated with the future,
its link to the past is no less central. As Kierkegaard once observed, Iife  is lived
forward but understood backward. Legal practitioners may have to experience the
working of enacted laws in the future, but they must understand it through the past.
As society is not homogenous, a myriad interests, ideologies and perceptions
would like the proposed law to incorporate what they deem best. Such desire makes a
lot of sense when we realize that laws, once enacted, have the power of the state
behind them, and they have an institutional character. The process of law enactment
or amendment is rightly regarded as deeply involved with human interests of the
3
whole society. Hence the fierce debate, lobbying, argumentation, behind-the-scene
horse trading and compromise in many stories we read in the press about law making.
These attributes are not unique to the legislative arena, but a part of life. “Forming a
coalition in order to support a policy, whether in a legislature or a boardroom,
involves standard techniques of horse-trading, persuasion, bribes, threats, and
management of information. These are the conventional procedures of discussion,
politics, and policy-formation (Baier, March and Saetren 1988: lS’7).”  There are
champions, opponents as well as onlookers. They have served as rich materials for
television soap operas, with some exaggerations added for theatrical effects.
The case of the power dimension in legislature is often over-shadowed by our
attraction to the idea of rationality, logical argument, legal niceties, and sense of
fairness. However, a close study of how laws are enacted clearly do not fit this
picture, as contained in the cited passage above. We are told often in the mass media
that a certain piece of proposed legislature would not be passed in Parliament because
the sponsor belongs to the minority opposition. We are not told how stupid the
proposal is. The dimension of power is quite evident in the case of how countries with
a weak democratic tradition bulldoze through Parliament various kinds of legislatures.
In the more extreme form, we have politicians who come to power by military coup,
only to amend the constitution and related laws to give the junta legal status.
If we use the above passage to reflect on the formation of IS strategy, we find
that the process of law making bears some striking similarities with the process of IS
strategy formation. There is ample literature documenting the issues of power,
politics, compromise and negotiations in IS strategy formulation, e.g. Walsham
(1993),  Jones (1994) and Heng and Newman (2000). The case of opponents to IS
strategic initiative is also well known, while the case of champions is less well
reported but important (Beath 1991). What we have not seen much in IS literature is a
rich account of bribes, threats and horse-trading. The case of brutal use of power to
impose a certain IS strategy, the nearest equivalent of a military coup in the preceding
passage, is when a company is a victim of a hostile takeover, and when the new owner
imposes its own IS strategy.
As to the dual features of ‘lived forward” and “understood backward” in the
italicised paraphrase of Mintzberg in an earlier passage, I would plead mischief, and
produce the original passage here. “While $rate&s  a word that is usually associated
with the future, its link to the past is no less central. As Kierkegaard  once observed,
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life is lived forward but understood backward. Managers  experience the working of
strategy in the future, but they must understand it through the past. Mintzberg (1989:
p.42)” The underlined words (strategy, Managers, strategy) have been substituted
with the words (law, Legal practitioners, enacted laws). Such exercise is more than
doing a game of word, as can be seen Corn the tiitfil discussion along similar line
by Lee (1991) who draws on Schon’s (1983) epistemology of reflection-in-action in
examining the use of architecture as a reference discipline for management
information systems.
3 The Need for Interpretation
The draftsmen who advise parliament on the drafting of legislation, judges and
lawyers have gone through more or less the standard legal training and share by and
large the same conventions in the use of words. Moreover they  have to operate  within
a strict set of rules regarding interpretation of laws, such as doctrines &precedent ad
doctrine of legislative supremacy. These would restrict if not totally eliminate
idiosyncratic conjectures and interpretations by the legal practitioners. In fact
interpretation of an enacted legislature forms an integral part of the legal profession
(Harris 1997; Friedman 1975; MacCormick  1994). In spite of these points, there is
special attention role assigned by society to judges and the courts to conduct
meticulous interpretation of written laws.
A rather natural question is: why the fuss about interpretation? The reasons are
not too difficult to find, and they are very sound. To begin with, draftsmanship is
often careless and imprecise (Friedman 1975). This defect could probably be reduced
with more careful of legal draftsmen and more rigorous training. The deeper reason is
associated with something beyond human control. The circumstances, intentions and
the whole societal climate of a legislature at the time of enactment are usually
different from the time the law is called into use. Social necessities and social opinion,
so wrote Sir Henry Maine (1861),  are always more or less in advance of the law. As
laws are encoded in natural language, words have meanings dependent on conventional
semantic and other rules of normal linguistic usage. “Words do not have fixed meanings;
unforeseen situations spring up. (Friedman 1975: p.267).”  In part, this reflects broader
social change  and the concomitant attitudinal shift  as well as accumulated understanding
of the merits and demerits of the legislature. That is why MacCormick (1994) insists
that legal decisions must make sense in the world and they must also make sense in the
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context of the legal system (p.  103). This point is quite evident when we reflect on the
changing attitude towards banning books on the basis that they are subversive or
obscene. For the Americans, the case of efforts to defend freedom of speech goes
beyond merely citing the first amendment of the US constitution. The descriptions of
efforts in this direction as documented in Rembar  (1968) reads like a novel in itself, full
of ingenuity,  tit, twists and turns, and intellectual conviction. Incidentally, the book also
illustrates that the struggle for a more enlightened interpretation is a skilful  act t&ing
place within a wider societal context, with its history, changing  norms and power
relations. The outcome is not assured a priofi. It reaf&ms  t,ht “J~sdiction h a broad
sense is dynamic. Active, ambitious agencies test the boundaries of neighbofing  agencies
looking  for soft  spots, weaknesses through which power can ooze (Ffie&mm  1975:
2 5 7 ) 99.
Though immense effort is poured into writing a law as clearly as possible, the
written law cannot pretend to anticipate all concrete cases of its future applications. The
result is a language of ambiguity. Ambiguity as a kind of confusion caused by multiple
meanings calls for social construction (Berger and Luckmann  1967; Weick 1995). Most
interpretations involve political interests, consequences, coercion, persuasion and
rhetoric (Weick 1995). When such interpretations by influential social actors and
powerful institutions are taken seriously by the members of a society, the new
interpretation acquires as it were a new “life” of its own, either intended by the original
authors of the law or otherwise. In this sense, it does affect the material world out there
by becoming objectified, diffised, and widely intemalised into what comes to be called a
consensus.
The emphasis given to interpretation of laws puts into shade the emphasis given
to interpretation in literature on IS strategy. Various methods of strategic information
systems planning treat the issue as non-problematic. The nearest I can find in the
recognition of this problem is in Walsham (1992) who argues for creative autonomy for
those involved in implementation The interpretative approach has gained a growing
following  as a useful method in conducting information systems research. But judging
from reports in IS research literature and business press, it has somehow not enjoyed a
similar  attention in the area of interpreting information systems strategy by IS
practitioners.
4 In Praise of Occasional Lapse
The richness of social life cannot be encapsulated in a set of rules. This crucial
aspect of our life has not escaped the sharp eyes of students of law. For example,
Pound (1954) points out that there is a distinction between “the law in books” and
“the law in action”. The latter is similar to the living law, a term coined by Ehrlich
(1936) to describe actual behaviour patterns in a community. According to Ehrlich,
social associations have an inner order which is the true determination of action. He
does not recommend that people should ignore the book law which contains norms for
decisions addressed to officials and may well affect what they do. Ordinary citizens,
however, follow the living law, the spontaneous norms of the social associations to
which they belong. This point is quite clear in the active underground economic
activity in Italy, and to a lesser degree in many other countries. These activities are
officially prohibited, but they contribute under the existing conditions of many
countries, to the vitality of the economy. Moreover, banning these activities all
together is well nigh impossible. In political life, it is also possible to operate very
well without clearly written constitution, e.g. the famous case of Britain  without a
written constitution. Viewed from this perspective, we should feel comfortable about
our limited ability to chum out adequate rules to regulate everything.
We often read about cases of island automation both in scholarly literature and
business press. This is seen as undesirable from the point of view strategic
information planning (Cash, McFarlan and McKenney 1988; Henderson, Thomas and
Venkatraman 1992). Viewed from the complex reality of social life, as illustrated in
our above study of drafting and actual application of legislature, their occurrence is
inevitable. It may makes more sense for IS strategy to deliberately leave room for a
bottom up approach. It would mean leaving resources for tinkering and bricolage
(Ciborra 1994). We must not assume that we can take care most of the essentiaZ
aspects of IS strategy, let alone all the potential rewarding applications. In other
words, strategy formulation should specifically allow spaces for systems to be
developed and to operate outside the known scope of the strategy, sometimes as a
case of island automation, sometimes as systems alien to the organisational structure
and culture. These systems are like the informal economy or black economy, illegal
from the legal point of view, yet filfilling some needs that cannot be fulfilled by the
legal business world. In a more exceptional case, an IS department can function
without a written statement of IS strategy, in a sort of adhocracy (Mintzberg 1989).
Why not? Just like Britain doing pretty well without a written constitution,
5 As Part of Symbolic Activity
As an important activity in socio-political life, law making bears certain deep
attributes of US as symbolic beings. The role of symbols has been widely studied by
anthropologists and sociologists, and has formed part of the standard material in
textbooks like Giddens (1995). Such dimension tends to be absent in law texts which
concentrate on the content of legal learning such as Friedman (1975),  Lloyd (1987)
and Harris (1997). If we look further than this, we do find reports of the symbolic
phenomenon of law making. Analyses of the United States Congress suggest that the
act of voting for legislation with appropriate symbolic meaning can be more important
than either its enactment or its implementation (Mayhew  1974). The law makers are
more interested in the support of their constituents, which leads them to be vigorous
in enacting policies but lax in issues related to their implementation. In order to secure
agreement on policy, the policies are often oversold, the real level of support for the
policy is exaggerated, and one common method for securing policy support is to
deliberately increase the ambiguity of a proposed policy (Baier, March and Saetren
1988).
Individuals and groups support often with exceptional effort and cost the
adoption of pollicies  that symbolize important affirmation, even where they are
relatively unconcerned with the ultimate implementation of the policies. In a rather
cynical sense, we are told by Arnold (1935: p.34),  “It is part of the function of Law to
give recognition to ideals representing the exact opposite of established conduct. Most
of the complications arise from the necessity of pretending to do one thing, while
actually doing another.”
The above observations on how law making bears profound similarities with
the social and cultural dimensions of the use of strategy as planning (Mintzberg
1987). Activities associated with IS/IT strategy do not occur in a social vacuum. In
other words, they are embedded in the broader societal milieu and operate under the
influence of its dominant business norms. Such norms attach value to rationality-
based business practices such as the formulation of a business plan. Knights and
Morgan (1991) remark that the whole concept of corporate strategy can be perceived
as a discourse (Foucault 1980). It shapes the way in which organizational members
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see themselves and their world; it also constitutes the problems it claims to solve. In
particular, strategic discourse is seen as having a number of specific power effects that
tend to reinforce the position of management in organizations. For example, strategy
can provide managers with a rationale for their actions, legitimize their power and
prerogatives, and support their sense of identity. The whole exercise related to IS
strategy formulation can be seen in this light and it would appear to be an issue of
convention, legitimacy and survival. This suggests that as part of formal practice, the
exercise of strategy formulation has symbolic properties. “Organizations are driven to
incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalised concepts of
organizational work and institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so increase
their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of
the acquired practices and procedures “(Meyer and Rowan 1977, p.340).  As revealed by
a chief information officer cited in Heng and Newman (2000),  the absence of strategic
information systems plan is seen to be a serious omission.
6 Concluding Remarks
In researching materials for this paper, I notice that law as a discipline and
profession had developed its identity and established its viability long before the
emergence of management and organizational studies, let alone information systems.
The legal practice is well known for its emphasis on logic, logical consistency and
rationality. In the words of Lloyd (1987),  the human mind feels a natural disposition
towards treating like cases alike, and this tendency plays an important role in the
functioning of the principles of justice. “What constitute like cases, however, though in
some instances fairly easy to resolve, may in others give rise to considerable doubt
(Lloyd 1987:267-8).”  Such difficulties is solved by the way lawyers and legal thinkers
reason their actual cases. They follow a pattern similar to that of everyday life. This is
hardly surprising, for law is a practical science dealing with everyday problems and is
expressed and argued in ordinary language. The upshot is that the social phenomena
surrounding law are very rich in the details of human activities such as negotiation,
consensus, interpretation, power struggle conducted in a civil manner, skilful  use of
language, and appeal to social norms. This fact provides a bridge for us to learn from
the world of legal practice as an attempt to understand the various issues and activities
in inforamtion  systems strategy formulation and implementation.
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From the four aspects that we examine in sections 2 to 5, it may be said that
there is a basis for the approach adopted in his paper. The study confirms that there
exist indeed affinities between law and information systems strategy. As suggestions
for further research, there are two areas which can be interesting. First is to explore
more areas of similarities between law and information systems strategy, beyond the
four aspects we look at so far, for example, the role of sudden change in the
environment or crisis induced transformation. Second, we can conduct a similar
exercise with other areas of information systems, for example, information systems
development and implementation.
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